It is a common view that the EU's legislative capacity is threatened by continuous accessions from the original six to the present fifteen member states with modest reforms of the institutional framework (König and Schulz 1997) . With about twelve applicant countries from Eastern and Southern Europe waiting to join the club, the fonhcoming enlargement highlights these doubts about the effectiveness and legitimacy ofEuropean (EU) legislation. Ir is feared that funher accessions, which would mean between 20 and 27 countries having to agree on Commission proposals, will dilute the Union's legislative activities. In addition, member states like France and Germany have exptessed their concerns that the entry of Eastern and Southern countries will change the existing balance between large and smaller member states. The accession of rather small and poor Eastern and Southern EU countries is supposed to allow for legislative coalitions excluding both large and rich member states. However, even though the Union has debated an institutional reform for a long time, there is linIe known about feasible solutions and their effects on legislative activities in a funher enlarged Union.
In this chapter, we will analyse the fonhcoming enlargement, alternatives of institutional reform and their likely consequences on decision-making in a Union consisting of up to 27 member states. We will focus on the danger for a legislative gridlock and an overextended commitment in terms of redistribution to poorer countries. Compared to previous enlargements, the danger of legislative gridlock is supposed to increase not only because of the increasing number of member states but also because of the greater differences between present member states and the Eastern and Southern accession countries. The second danger of an overextended commitment we are referring to has to do with the accession of comparably poor states which are likely to be in favour of more redistribution. To analyse these likely effects we study legislation in two policy domains, employment politics and agricultural policies, and outline a solution for an institutional reform on the basis of two requirements: first, gridlock danger should be avoided The debate on the Union's institutional reform has been closely associated with enlargements. The Treary of Rome 1958 gave provision for majoriry voting. The Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, however, made sure that individual member states have the right to veto decisions. In the mid-8os the ten member states had agreed on applying Qualified Majoriry Voting (QMV) in order to enable the internal market project. Before Portugal and Spain joined the club in 1986 QMV was introduced in a number of policy domains. Since then a threshold at 71.2 per cent has been sufficient to achieve a majoriry with differing voting weights for large and small states.
The application of QMV, however, became the target of criticism on the Union's legislative process because it allows large portions of member state citizens to become excluded. Among the critics we find integrationist as well as antiintegrationist forces: The latter stress concerns for member state sovereignry and demand a re-nationalisation of the Union's competencies, while the former favour the extension of the competencies of the European Parliament (EP). In the past, both sides have partly realised their claims. The Parliament received considerable power not only because of the introduction of the co-operation procedure in 1987 and the 1993 co-decision procedure, which was modified in the Amsterdam Treary (1997) . The Maastricht Treary also strengthened the subsidiariry principIe that ofters a rather sketchy scheme for the seleetion of level of competence. Great complexiry is reflected in the present puzzle of more than twenry procedures applied to decision-making in the EU (Nentwich and Falkner 1997= 2) .
Under almost all procedures, after the Commission or the Commissioner introduces aproposal, the Council of Ministers mayadopt or reject it by the required majoriry or change the Commission text by unanimiry. Under the codecision procedure the EP may also propose amendments or reject the text that has been modified by the Council. These provisions -initiative by the Commission, adoption by the Council and, if necessary, co-decision with the EP -will certainly remain unchanged in the near future, while the Council majoriry thresholds are likely to come under revision.
Apart from detailed theoretical and empirical findings on the state of the Union there is linle knowledge about the effects following from enlarging the Union. The major problem is how to conceive the future interests of EU legislative actors, be they either member states or accession countries. In applying our approach to the topic of upcoming enlargement and institurional reform we must accordingly make a number ofsimplifications to analyse the complex interaetions between these actors and voting mIes. 
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Note: Aetors A to E eaeh has a most preferred poliey denoted by a dot, the further away any other poliey is, the less attraetive it iso If the status quo is inside the unanimity core ('Pareto-set,' i.e. the hull of points A to E) no alternative poliey will unanimously be approved by all aetors. If the status quo is inside the 4/5-core no alterna-tive will be approved by at least 4 aetors. The Pareto-set and the 4/5-eore thus determine the danger of gridloek under unanimity and 4/5-majority rule.
To introduee Out analytieal eoneept, considet a Couneil with five member states that have substantially different interests in poliey outcomes. Assume that aetors' interests in policy outcomes ean be eoneeived as 'ideal points' in a two-dimensional spaee where poliey outcomes are the less attraetive the futther they are from the aetor's ideal point. Such an example for aetors' preferenees is shown in Figute  14 .1, where the dots represent ideal points of five aetors A to E. The outeome is not only determined by the preferenees of the individual states but also by the loeation of status quo under the voting rules. So how will the Couneil deeide? What is the likely outeome?
Let us assume that deeisions in the Couneil are to be taken by qualified majority vote (QMV) of at least 4 aetors (q = 4/5). If the status quo is loeated far away from the ideal points of all aetors, e.g. somewhere to the left of aetor A, poliey change of the status quo might be obtained bya move in-between the aetors' ideal points. But if the status quo is inside the shaded area, poliey change is impossible sinee at least one aetor within any possible 4/ 5-eoalitions would then be worse off. This is defining the QMV eore. In praetiee there is no poliey alternative inside the core that would do better than the status quo. Aeeordingly, the core (or 'Pareto-set' in the ease of unanimity) comprises all status quo points that eannot be beaten by any other alternative.
The introduction of the core coneept allows us to make the following two conclusions. First, if the status quo is loeated outside the eore, the legislative outeome will be loeated within the eore -beeause at least one outeome within the core is superior. Seeond, if the status quo is loeated inside the eore, poliey change is impossible sinee at least one state in the winning eoalition would then be worse off (Ordeshook 1986: 371; Hinich and Munger 1997: 61) . Thus, any member state ean be assumed to have an interest in remaining within or as near the eore as possible in order to avoid exclusion from the winning coalition.
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For the study of the procedural effects on the Union's legislation we use the core concept to outline both the location of legislative outcomes and the risk of legislative gridlock. The gridlock danger is defined as the likelihood that policy change is made impossible. Ir follows from the assumption that the smaller the core is, the higher is the likelihood that policy change will occur and vice versa. The redistribution danger maybe translated to the likelihood that the outcome shifts the status quo in a certain direction. Ir follows that the doser an individual state is located to the core, the lower is the risk to get outvoted. Thus, the size 0/ the core determines the danger of a gridlock. Changes in its location may bring the Union doser to the dangers of over-commitment in terms of redistribution.
Comparing Agricultural and Employment Politics
With regard to different structures and interests of member states, most accession scenarios focus on the economic performance of the applicant countries (Baldwin 1994; Hagen 1997) . Though all applicants have been given the status of a formal Accession partnership, the Commission's Agenda 2000 sets up different criteria for letting them join the dub. This admission catalogue not only includes measurements of economic development and a functioning market economy. Ir also requires a quantifiable level of social protection, control over public debt and inflaeion, open economy, a modern fiscal system and administrative capacity to implement EU legislation (Baldwin 1994: 155) . From today's perspective, the accession of all applicants would increase the Union's population by around 30 per cent but its GOP would rise by only 4 per cent.
Considering the Union's budget, the structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policies (hereafter CAP) may cause considerable costs of enlargement when the process is completed. Currently members set off 1.27 per cent of GOP to ehe common budget of ehe EU (Streit and Voigt 1997) . The EU's agricultural sector and its poorer regions receive about 80 per cent of all EU spending. Since the Eastern applicants are populous, poor and agricultural, an unaltered framework of the CAP would increase the Union's budget by nearly 40 billion euro. Moreover, applying the structural funds would raise the annual coses by 26 billion euro (Baldwin 1995: 477) . Tax: raising, however, seems to be unfeasible to cope with these deficits. Any further enlargement of the Union would probably have to be accompanied by budget cuts. For this reason the opinion on easrward enlargement is less favourable in the Southern, poor and agricultural member states, while Northern incumbents expect some gains from deepened trade relations (Michalsky and Wallace 1992: 54).
To analyse the likely effects of enlargement for EU agricultural politics, we will have to consider rwo indicators. First, the importance of the agrieultural sector for the national economies (measured by agriculture as a share of gross domestic product) and second, their wealth (by gross domestic product (GOP) per capita). Supposedly, the higher a member state's dependency is on the agri- Table I4 .I: Basic data ofEU-15 and 12 applicant countries Sources: Commission (1998); Commission (1999) ; Commission (1997b) (a, b); United Nations/ Commission for Eurape (1998) (c) a. Grass domestic praduct per capita 1995 (eeu in euerent market prices). b. Agricultural share of total grass value added 1995. c. Unemployment rates 1996 (annual average).
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The Unions Institutional Reform and Enlargement cultural sector, the more it will favour EU budget contributions 10 CAP, while the higher the GOP per capita is, the less astate will prefer an increase of the total EU budget. Combining these indicators should provide us with a reasonable picture of potential confliets over EU legislation.
As regards the funding of the EU budget, the member states' contributions based on their GOP are the most imponant of the four types ofsources that make up the EU's own resourees. Currently, they eonstitute about half of the total budgetary revenue. As the exaet GOP rate is determined under the budgetary procedure, this type of resouree is an instrument to bring budgetary revenue in balance with expenditure (Nugent 1994: 343) . Table 14 .1 shows GOP per eapita and the size of the agrieultural sector in 1995 for the 15 EU member states and 12 applieant countries. In terms of GOP per eapita, there is a rather elear demareation between EU members and non-members. All present ineumbents are wealthier than all applieants with the exeeption of Cyprus. Eeonomie wealth differs widely even within the Union ranging from 8.360 eeu per eapita in Greeee to 32.370 eeu per eapita in Luxembourg. The size of the agrieultural sector also differs between Eastern European and most EU member states. The economies of the former states are mueh more dependent on the agrieultural seetor. In this respeet Greeee is again a notable outsider within the EU; Germany, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, in eontrast, have the lowest primary sector share.
CAP is eertainly the most traditional EU poliey domain raising many obstaeies to enlargement. The other poliey domain under serutiny is employment polities that has beeome more important with the Amsterdam Treaty's eall for soeial polieies. On the other hand the Monetary Union is making it even more important to co-ordinate member states' polieies. With the Amsterdam Treaty the Community has been given a new task. Reaehing a high level of employment is a 'matter of eommon coneern' (Art. 2, EC Treaty) that is to be taken into aeeount when formulating polieies in other Community areas. Although the employment ehapter is eonsidered to be of limited imponanee for the strengthening of the soeial poliey domain, it points towards astronger soeial dimension within the EU, involving it in proteeting the eoneerns ofeitizens (Langrish 1998: 18) . We will use figures on the rate of unemployment to analyse the potential confliet over the employment policy domain.
The Commission finds that five aeeession countries, namely the Czeeh Republie, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, ean already be regarded as funetioning market eeonomies, even if important aspeets still need to be developed, and a sixth, Slovakia, is approaehing this eriterion (Commission 1997a; 1997b) . Looking at the development of the unemployment rates in 27 European countries, we find a somewhat different pieture. Under the present 12 applieant countries there are some with a low unemployment rate (the Czeeh Republie and Cyprus) as weil as some with a rate at the EU-15 mean (like Slovenia) or even quite high rates (like Latvia or Bulgaria). With Luxembourg having the smallest and Spain having the highest unemployment rate, the forthcoming enlargement will merely inerease the diversity in the employment area within the EU. To illustrate the likely effeets of enlargement for EU politics, we eompare deeision-making under unanimous and QMV eule in agrieultural and employment polities. Both poliey domains refer to the same input-dimension as GOP per eapita partieularly determines member states' finaneial eontribution to the EU budget. However, both differ with respeet to the output-dimension of EU polities beeause member states and aeeession eountries have different interests in both policy domains. For agrieultural polities we assume that member states' poliey preferenees are determined by the importanee of their agrieultural seet6r (as a share ofgross domestie praduet) and their grass domestie praduet per eapita (Figure 14.2) . By the latter we refer to the input-side of member states in the EU budget, while the former refers to the output-side in form of CAP.
In Figure 14 .2, member states are loeated by their agrieultural seetor's pereentage of total grass value added (z-seored) and their (z-seored) grass domestie producr per eapita.I Oue to the extreme loeation of Greeee, the Pareto-set under the present unanimous deeision-making is already pretty large in agrieultural polities, and will inerease substantially with an enlargement. Exeept for Cyprus, all eandidates are outside the present Pareto-set, whieh will lead to an expansion of the Pareto-set and a higher gridloek danger in agrieultural polities under unanimous deeision-making. Under the eurrent QMV rule 63 out of 87 votes are required. While the present QMV eore only includes haly and Franee, the enlarged QMV core of 27 members will shift in favour of the new member states. For both voting rules, the result would be a higher gridloek danger in eonneetion to agrieultural polities, whieh presendy eneompasses about half of the Union's budget.
While the size of the primary seetor is negatively related to wealth, unemployment seems less related to GOP per eapita. Figure 14 .3 shows the loeation of the 27 states in eomparison eoneerning unemployment rates and GOP per eapita ngures. Spain would still have the highest unemployment rate in an enlarged Union, while most aeeession countries would have below-average unemployment rates. The present Pareto-set under unanimity is therefore made up of Spain, Portugal, Austria and Luxembourg. Unemployment numbers fluetuate widely aeross 
Transparency, Decision Probability and Exclusion Risk
accession countries but, above all, the Pareto-set will increase because of the GOP differences of the 27 states. Equally, enlargement would shift the core in favour of the twelve accession states, whereas the GOP per capita would increase only modestly. In sum, the results confirm both fears associated with a forthcoming enlargement of CAP. The accession will increase both the core under unanimous as well as under QMV decision making, and it will shift the balance between larger and small member states. According to our findings on employment politics, the core will also be increased due to differences in GOP per capita, while the QMV core will only be slightly expanded but put the smaller countries in a more favourable position. For these reasons, any institutional reform has to feature quite different conditions resulting from the embedded differences in preferences within the Union's policy domains. On the one hand, areform therefore has to diminish the size of the core by decreasing the Council's voting threshold in order to avoid gridlock. On the other hand, a decrease of the Council's voting threshold must take account of the balance between large and small member states which otherwise due to the enlargement is likely to move towards small countries.
Besides the gridlock and redistribution danger, the present variety of legislative procedures and the complexity of regulations are further causing critique of the Union's institutions. The reproach faces ladung transparency resulting from the functional construction that focuses on technocratic feasibility rather than political competitiveness. The events occurring during the Maastricht ratification process like the failure in the Oanish referendum have convincingly shown the risk with the EU appearing as a technocracy (König and Hug 2000) . As a consequence, the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference in 1997 decided to reduce the set of procedural settings. In the future, EU legislation should be based on two procedures, the intergovernmental standard procedure without parliamentary involvement and a (modified) co-decision procedure with the EP as co-legislator. Reduction of complexity, however, may only satisfy the transparency of decision-making, while effectiveness will depend on further reform.
Both developments, the accession of countries and the extension of parliamentary competencies, will modify the legislative effecriveness in a manner that threatens to lead to a gridlock. The additional indusion of the EP has already increased the gridlock danger in legislation since the Commission's proposals have to avoid veto. The present 71.2 per cent voting threshold of the Council and its unanimity provision in particular are under review because a further enlarged Union would require a coalition of 20 or 27 countries. Hence, the Union's effectiveness would then be endangered by high gridlock. Thus, the question is not whether, but how the Council's threshold should be changed.
In Table 14 .2 we apply a simple measure to outline the Unions effectiveness problems. The gridlock danger is making decision less probable. Technically speaking, the probability for decision should be interpreted as the relation between the number of winning coalitions and all possible winning coalitions.
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Comparing with previous enlargements, the gridlock danger has increased enormously and is likely to continue to rise in connection to turther accessions. Under unanimity, formal decision probability has decreased by about 99 per cent between 1958 and 1986. The twelve member states managed to raise decision probability by approximately 400 per cent when the quali6ed majority rule was introduced in 1986. Compared to the value of 1986, QMV decision probability has decreased by about 20 per cent since the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. Ir can be predicted that it will go down an additional 29 per cent compared to the 1986 level if 27 countries would join the Union. It is likely that already a 6rst accession consisting of, for instance, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia will make the probability for decision drop 47 per cent compared to 1986 under QMV A second wave including, for instance, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta would according to the same estimation make the decision probability drop another 29 per cent. This development is, of course, even more problematic if unanimity is required. Regarding the Union's effectiveness under (modi6ed) co-decision procedure (Art. 251), we 6nd a lower decision probability than under the old provisions (exArt. 189b). Compared to the QMV standard procedure, the modi6ed co-decision procedure will loose effectiveness. This effect is due to the weakening of me Council. Previously the Council could adopt its original proposal under unanimity if the conciliation committee could not work out a compromise between Council and EP. In spite of this modification, the new co-decision procedure cannot solve the Union's effectiveness problems. They will increase enormously with further accessions. This would certainly raise pressures for reform of the major institutions and strengthen the case for lowering the Council's threshold as one condition for reform.
The likely development of the Union's effectiveness shows that the Union has to lower the Council's threshold in order to avoid gridlock. However, lowering the threshold mayaiso in its turn affeet the balance between large and small mem- Table 14 .2: Change of decision probability (P(v)/P(q,ase)) 
0.6
The Unions Institutional Reform and Enlargement ber states (König and Bräuninger 1998) . In particular, forthcoming enlargements by Eastern and Southern countries may allow coalition-building without large member states. In response, two proposals have been discussed in the course of the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference: the French delegation has proposed to redistribute voting weights with 25 votes for large members and three votes for the smallest countries thereby maintaining the present QMV threshold at 71.2 per cent. Germany favoured the additional criterion that at least 60 per cent of the Union's population must agree on changing the status quo by QMY. Neither one of the proposals is convincing in terms of effectiveness, since neither the French nor the German proposal would significandy modiEY the present QMV conditions. However, both proposals reveal the problem of institutional reform: member states must accept a higher risk ofbeing excluded in order to avoid legislative gridlock. However, particularly large members try to safeguard their position in the EU that would be threatened by the lowering of the threshold in the Council. The decisive question is whether it is feasible to decrease the gridlock danger and seeure the balance between large and small member states at the same time. In Figure 14 .4, the likely effects of a reform are compared to the present QMV rule and an absolute majority rule with regard to the individual exclusion risk of member states)
The present threshold at 71.2 per cent has successfully secured the balance between large and small member states. By contrast, the introduction of the absolute majority requirement would dilute the differences between large and small member states in terms of getting excluded from any winning coalition. One solution may be obtained by maintaining the 2/3 threshold and by redistributing votes (see Table 14 .2). With 27 countries within the Union votes may be redistributed in the following way according to our solution. Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom would receive 23 votes, Poland and Spain 18 votes, Romania 16 votes, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands and Portugal 10 votes, Austria, Bulgaria and Sweden 8 votes, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, and Slovakia 4 votes, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia 2 votes.
Comparing the curves of all three scenarios, the exclusion risk will remain the same under the present 71.2 per cent threshold and the proposed two-thirds threshold since the difference between large and small countries would be 0.3. Since small states would still have an exclusion value of 0.53, their position is not subject to luck. Finally, this solution would have adecision probability of 90 per cent of the value of 1986. In our view, this modification is a feasible solution for the Union's institutional reform. However, the question remains how a lowering of the Council threshold and the redistribution ofvoting weights would affect the political direction of EU legislation.
The Outlook: Estimating the Reform Effects on Agricultural and Employment Politics
Our formal analyses shows that there are some solutions to the problem of effectiveness and the risk for exclusion of member states. Due to the quite justified criticism on transparency, however, we argue that such areform would have to apply to all policy domains. An increase of the procedural variety would only lead to less transparency. For this reason, the reform solution may affeet the coalition structure different depending on how the preferences of individual governments are shifting in various issues. How our reform solution fulfils the criteria is revealed in Figures 14.5 and 14.6 by comparing the effects of our proposal on the agricultural and employment policy domains.
The comparative analysis of the CAP indicates that our solution would fulfil both criteria in the agricultural policy sector. The decrease of the Council's threshold to 66 per cent and the redistribution of member state voting weights will not only diminish the size of the core in agricultural policies. It would also shift the location of the core towards the larger member states. Similar findings are shown by Figure 14 .6, showing the core in employment politics.
Like in agricultural politics, the reform solution would diminish the core in Key: see Figure I4 .5: EU institutional reform: Change in agricultural politics employment policy and shift it closer to the preferences of the larger member states. Compared to unanimous decision-making, the decreased size of the core indicates that the gridlock danger can be avoided by applying QMV, especially by demanding two-third majority voting with the redistribution of votes as presented here. In both policy domains, an application of the present QMV provisions cannot prevent a gridlock or a change of the existing balance between large and small member states. Our solution promises the proper functioning and maintenance of the current equilibrium. For this reason, the solution presents a feasible response to the continuous debate on institutional reform triggered by any forthcoming enlargement of the Union. For Europe, enlargement is certainly an historie opportunity to end its artificial division, and therefore it is interesting to look for strategies that may appropriately serve the cause of institutional reform for future EU legislation. A major topic of the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference was to prepare the Union for further enlargements. Despite the quite positive echo heard from officials, the Arnsterdam Treaty is primarily concerned with employment and stability problems of the present fifteen member states, but postpones the issues of institutional reform. Originally developed by the six founding states to regulate 
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policies as positive-sum games, new accessions are considered to threaten the functioning of the Union's legislative processes. Today's member states are looking for procedural settings to preserve the proper functioning with respect to both the Union's capacity to act and their influence on European decision-making. 3.0 This chapter has analysed both aspects of the Union's institutional reform. We argued that a feasible institutional reform has to fulfil at least two criteria, diminishing the size of the core despite an increasing number of members and the preservation of its current location by protecting the status of the larger countries. Our analyses show that there is an institutional solution satisfying these requirements. From our perspective, the analyses are powerful when it comes to choosing mIes given knowledge about the preferences of actors. Moreover, they outline coalition oppoftunities since both contain the likely outcomes of coalition-building. What is hard to know is, of course, how the preferences of actors might change. We have assumed that institutional reform can be traced by voting power Figure I4 .6: EU institutional reform: Change in unemployment politics analyses taking into account both decision probability and the risk of exclusion of member states.
Conclusion
The analyses have shown that enlargement will affeet legislative decision-making in the domains of CAP and employment policy. The share of the primary sector and GOP per capita helps us to determine the likely preferences of the newcomers that wants to join the Union. Since most of the applicants have a large primary sector, it widens the coalition in favour of subsidies in that area while the comparably low GOP per capita of the applicants helps us to predict the expansion of employment politics. QMV under the present provisions would increase the size of the core and shift its location in both policy domains. This means that any forthcoming enlargement will not only raise the gridlock danger in agricultural and employment politics but also change the balance between large and small member states in favour of the lauer. This development, however, can be brought to a halt by decreasing the Council's threshold to two-thirds majority voting and by redistributing votes among member states according to the solution we have presented. Naturally, there are other ways to solve the Union's institutional dilemma wh~n facing a forthcoming enlargement. However, our proposal provides at least one optional solution for how to manage the situation. Coleman (1971: 278) the decision probability is Formally, we define the indusiveness wi(v) of actor i in the game vas (Bräuninger 1996: 41): i.e. as the number of times an emity participates in winning coalitions in relation to the number of all feasible winning coalitions.
